UN REQUIEM PER LA RIVOLTA LIBICA
di Pier Francesco Zarcone
Pur sperando che non vada a finire così, indubbiamente in questo paese il quadro è cambiato. Gheddafi è in marcia su Bengasi e ha “ripulito” la parte occidentale the coast. A revolt in early seemingly unstoppable now has before him the prospect of defeat and the most cruel repression. Cynically speaking, the colonel had the good sense to use the sea of \u200b\u200bmoney on which to base sailing armed force of his regime on the bodies of chosen members of his tribe and a robust body of foreign mercenaries armed and very well paid . There is no secret that the Libyan rebels on their own - at least that is without adequate supplies of arms and ammunition - do not make it. Theoretical assumption of a direct intervention of imperialist powers it already has expressed in the negative and motivated. But the rebels have outside help, otherwise Gaddafi wins. There remains the question of what should be done in this situation? Beyond the existence of repeated verbal and more options, and voids Gaddafi calls because if they go, the imperialist powers are not going. So avoid mixing more trouble. We also understand the reason for inaction, beyond French diplomatic initiative which resulted in the recognition of the revolutionary council of Benghazi (unilateral initiative by the taste of booking petrilifere concessions in case of victory, or resistance, the rebels, but nothing more .) already engaged in Iraq and Afghanistan, Western powers are unwilling (and affordable) to open a third front, while sapendo che un Gheddafi vittorioso presenterà il conto a chi lo ha “mollato” dopo aver fatto affari con lui e averlo coccolato. In base all’atteggiamento complessivo di tali potenze, e alle cose da loro dette e non dette, si può pensare che siano in gioco alcuni fattori senza i quali si capirebbe poco: la diffidenza per i ribelli libici dei quali non si sa molto e la loro appartenenza a un mondo fortemente tribalizzato (col rischio di una ripetizione del caos somalo); la presunzione/speranza che la fine della crisi libica normalizzi i prezzi petroliferi; e per finire l’interesse ad avere qualcuno disposto a essere il disumano (ma utile) custode della costa sud in funzione anti-immigrazione verso l’Europa. In fondo è l’ennesima dimostrazione di come per l’imperialismo i dittatori di un certo colore, pur se figli di puttana, siano sempre “i propri” figli di puttana, e di come risulti più “proficuo” che la democrazia borghese resti confinata nel “primo mondo” e i diritti umani siano alibi per operazioni economicamente proficue.Questa critica non è necessariamente in contraddizione con il giudizio negativo circa un intervento diretto dell’Occidente, se procediamo nel senso di dare una risposta alla domanda sul “che fare”. In realtà il soggetto collettivo suscettibile di agire, e a cui potrebbero essere forniti i necessari supporti, ci sarebbe: la Lega Araba. Questo organismo alla fine ha chiesto the establishment of a UN no-fly zones. This initiative is not reducible to the mere declaration of disqualification of an air space, because without a prompt and adequate military preparedness - destroying radar systems and contrarei and operational capacity of local aviation - all would have no effect. But I still do not understand those who should provide? Perhaps the West? A further demonstration of hypocrisy, because before that the UN is moving (and we have always known that the UN only moves to quell the riots, not to encourage them), and that after his "way" to do so by the employees execution, Gaddafi has already vinto.In reality little if the scandal at the Arab League had decided to arrange itself to the task, getting all the information deemed by the West to prepare for the no-fly zones. And in practice you could give the executive post to Egypt, with a respectable air force. Same time should not be difficult to quickly replenish the rebels arms they need, because if it is the air force Tripoli to "soften" the positions, specifically are armed with Gaddafi to conquer them. But you can safely bet that this will not happen. The consequences will not be limited to Libya or vindictive reactions of Gaddafi outside of his country, bensì il fatto stesso della sua vittoria avrebbe conseguenze pesanti e negative nei paesi – come lo Yemen, per esempio – in cui da settimane il popolo cerca di mandare a casa il dittatore locale. Sarà quindi la Libia lo scoglio su cui si infrangerà l’ondata della ribellione araba che, nel suo complesso e nella sua pericolosa dinamica, non è stata mai vista di buon occhio dall’Occidente? Riflessioni provvisorie (forse) sugli eventuali sbocchi “democratici” nei paesi arabi liberati.In una precedente corrispondenza si era parlato dell’assenza, a breve o medio termine, di prospettive di rivoluzione sociale (in senso proprio) nei paesi arabi in cui la rivolta ha avuto successo e in quelli dove è still ongoing. They seem to be in place formal processes for the establishment of representative democracy of the bourgeois type, perhaps the most effective systems put in place by false or depose deposed dictators. Better than nothing, you might say, those in favor and stay in the corner (like this writer) to what was once called "direct democracy" (also known by the Greek Communists in the last century "laocrazia). Certainly the advent of representative democracy is an improvement over the tyrannical and bloodthirsty Arab autocracies, however, even from the standpoint of the revolutionary left it well-known shortcomings, limitations and even dangers for the emancipation of the people. The fact remains that not all systems in category "representative democracy" are equal: some are better, others worse. At this point demands a fresh (albeit brief) on some fundamental problems that have to do heavy political processes in the Arab world - regardless of the factor "Islamic radicalism" - taking into account a key element: representative democracy contradicts itself (that is pure front) where the lack of respect for opponents (enemies you could make a separate discussion) and space for the so-called "political discourse". In a less stately language, this means that to take blows per strada (o peggio) gli avversari è fuori dalla normale logica democratica. Quindi, la manifestazione delle donne cairote dell’8 marzo, interrotta dall’arrivo di un’orda di uomini minacciosi e pronti a usare le mani, non è una bella premessa per l’avvento di uno stato di cose diverso dal passato..Veniamo ora al resto dei problemi in campo. La prima questione è che nei due paesi liberatisi del proprio dittatore la cosa è riuscita grazie all’atteggiamento assunto dai rispettivi eserciti (per quanto si trattasse di dittatori di estrazione militare, passati dalla caserma al palazzo presidenziale). Pensare a un prossimo futuro libero da pretese politiche dei militari pare un po’ azzardato, soprattutto in Egitto (But not exclusively), where generals and senior officers also run a major economic power, largely autonomous. Political equation to be solved in a near future it is a factor M of a certain weight. But there are other unknowns, and come from the socio / cultural needs of the various Arab countries. First, it must be a common element to both the dictatorships and corrupt at the top of the bourgeois democracies: the repressive apparatus, that is, not ever play a unique role in maintaining "order", for there is an additional tool by the importance not negligible, whose name is maintaining the population in the cultural degradation and / or obscurantism. And this is a situation defined by massa.Si then take that - for better or for worse - representative democracy (array bourgeois, let us not forget) is based sull'atomizzazione individual. Also present are the pages of Marx on the meaning of metaphor for social / economic myth of the "noble savage" coined in the early stage of capitalism. It does not seem right that it operates in Arab societies. This leads us to a figure that would not be specific to the Arab world if there is not presented with a particular quantitative and qualitative significance: it is the particular inhomogeneous internal to these companies, although these realities collective differences between them individually if considered in a comprehensive manner. It is not, of course, a feature exclusive to this part of the world, presenting each of the companies within it in a more or less uneven. Just think of the effect of regional differences on economic, social and cultural diversity among major cities, provincial towns and countryside, as well as the interrelationships between all these fattori.Nel Arab world are expressing a lack of homogeneity of social realities coexist (with all that the word implies) even for belonging to what we Westerners would have different historical periods. Or express the mixture in individual sectors of society, and elements of typical situations defined sia dei secoli XX e XXI sia dei secoli precedenti; di un “passato” immobile, si potrebbe dire. Non ci si deve fermare alla diversità urbana esistente, per esempio, tra la yemenita Sanaa e la siriaca Damasco, perché poco significativa, ma si deve evidenziare come rapporti socio/economici di tipo “medievale” (per intenderci alla buona) e i corrispondenti orizzonti culturali non esistono solo nelle campagne, sulle montagne o nelle oasi, ma anche all’interno dei grandi contesti urbani (come il Cairo, Algeri, o Rabat). Questi rapporti sociali arcaici appartengono al tribalismo e/o a forme di clientelismo “parafeudale” economico e politico. A ciò si aggiungano i fortissimi vincoli che fanno dipendere people from their families (rarely mononuclear) and the clan to which the family belongs. And families and clans in some Arab societies are still part of a tribe. All these arrangements produce a pyramidal structure of the company at its apex facing the privileged classes, remained unchanged in Tunisia as in Egitto.Un new element (but still not be determined by weight) showed today by the large number of young people whose horizons in some way have been expanded by the use of modern information technologies and communication. Here is an unknown factor X that might be relevant, at least in terms of potential. The phenomenon needs to be monitored carefully, since Arab societies - unlike the European ones - form a majority made up of young people. Take Saudi Arabia (which we reserve the right to speak in the next match with greater amplitude), where 60% of the population is under 30 years, the average age is 19 years young, the use of Internet in 2010 had increased by 240% and affects at least 3 million people. And last but not least there are closures and religious fanaticism, not to assimilate usual obscurantist Islamic radicalism and bomber. We refer to a specific factor, "traditional" so to speak, read in the light of the principle: "Maybe religion is not necessarily the opium of the people but holding strong dosi fa malissimo, a chi la assume e al prossimo suo”. È un fattore che non riguarda solo i musulmani, ma anche certe minoranze cristiane. I paesi arabi ad avere tali minoranze religiose di un qualche rilevo sono Palestina, Siria, Iraq (forse ancora per poco) ed Egitto (qui addirittura si tratta del 10% circa della popolazione). Proprio in Egitto coabitano due chiusure religiose: la musulmana (ben nota) e la copta, assai meno nota ma non meno dura. Se negli ultimi giorni di lotta al Cairo si sono visti affiancati a piazza Tahir croci copte e Corani, di recente abbiamo avuto, sempre al Cairo in un quartiere popolare, una contrastata storia d’amore fra un giovane copto e una giovane musulmana sfociata in tumulti di piazza a cui hanno preso by hundreds and hundreds of people, the beauty of finished with 14 deaths and several hundred wounded. Another bad segnale.Questo accumulation of factors is of such magnitude as to show the very difficult path to democratic systems / representative as we understand them in Europe. Depending on the forces that prevail, at the most likely scenarios are that of "totalitarian democracy" prevailed if the closure of a religious, authoritarian, and that of parliamentary systems, especially if the military would lay their mortgage on the current political processes. With the addition that no change in the structure of the privileged classes (the majority or agricultural pests or comprador bourgeoisie), regardless of "who" they comprise, in both cases the persistence of widespread corruption would be anything but surprising. With what segue.Abbattere dictators is never easy, but at some point it becomes possible, and in different sizes companies freed them of what is not possible overnight. Moreover, there is always the risk that the momentum of popular off (even for the people there is the difficulty of the transition from the condition of his subjects than of citizens) and the disappointment of mass re-open the way for tomorrow's autocrats.
from Utopia red
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