POLITICAL REVIVAL IN THE ARAB WORLD
; ; Pier Francesco Zarcone
Requests for freedom and social justice within the whole Arab world does not subside, even stretch.
Last weekend an Italian television had just had time to settle in Oman tourist attractions and conveniences that we learn of riots occurred in the distant sultanate in the city of Sohar, finished with two deaths. Here too democratic demands of young demonstrators. More or less the polar opposite - Tunis - after a pitched battle with police, the people have obtained the resignation of Prime Minister Muhammad Gannouchi (item colluded with the regime of Ben Ali) replaced by Beji Caid Essebsi, considerato personaggio ben più liberale. In più a Beirut un folto gruppo di giovani ha manifestato per la fine delle lottizzazioni confessionali delle istituzioni statali – lascito dell’imperialismo francese in base al vecchio principio divide et impera - e per l’instaurazione di... uno Stato laico! Questo, nel paese che viene considerato roccaforte degli Hezbollah sciiti. E a proposito di sciiti non si può non parlare del sangue sparso nel regno insulare del Bahrein (si legge più o meno “bachrain”), di cui ancora Wikipedia decanta la stabilità politica e sociale. La ribellione contro il regime del locale monarca assolutista presenta una particolarità assente in Nordafrica: l’esistenza di un retroterra religioso diverso da quello della dinastia regnante. Infatti il monarca è musulmano sunnita, mentre la maggioranza del popolo è musulmana sciita. Vale a dire, della stessa componente islamica egemone in Iran, maggioritaria in Iraq, consistente in Libano e presente anche in Siria e Giordania,. oltre che in Arabia Saudita. L’importanza di questa specificità sfugge a quanti considerano religiosamente monolitico il mondo islamico, e si fermano alla distinzione (spesso approssimativa) fra “moderati” ed “estremisti”. In realtà non è così. I media borghesi trattano di sunniti e sciiti come se si trattasse di benedettini e di domenicani: cioè come se fossero parti – magari locali – di un unicum religioso, mentre per rendere più chiari i rapporti reciproci sarebbe meglio fare il parallelo fra cattolici e protestanti irlandesi, o fra cattolici e ortodossi russo-balcanici. Cosa che produce la circolazione di notizie da cui non si capisce niente. Per esempio: si parla spesso di attentati islamici in Pakistan contro moschee, al che il lettore ordinario conclude nel senso che gli islamici sono dei barbari o dei pazzi; ma non si dice che le moschee oggetto di attentati sono sciite, gli attentatori sunniti, e nulla si spiega sul perché di questi attacchi. Niente di strano, perché ormai è notorio come l’abbondanza di dati diramati dai mezzi di communication of the "system" rarely gives the city what they need to really understand. What is happening in Bahrain is part of the chapter of contemporary history to define "political awakening, or collected, the Shiites," and determines a special section on the revival in Arabia. In a nutshell: since the so-called "Iranian Revolution" Shias have gone to considerable political activity in Iraq and Lebanon, also reaffirming their opposition to the Sunni. Taking into account the value of historical landmarks for the Eastern mentality, were full of meaning although the forced analogies used by the propaganda of Saddam Hussein during the war with Iran, including the battles current and old ones that at the dawn of Islam, Shiite followers countered the first (defined Sunni) Umiyyadi of the caliphs of Damascus. Today, the Shiites are in power not only in Iran but also in Iraq and put heavy mortgages on the government of Lebanon, was artificially created French imperialism after 1918 (during the Ottoman Empire the region was part of Syria). The claims of the Bahraini people are more than justified. If anything in the upheaval taking place in this little archipelago from the starting point for considerations on the broader regional context in which it is likely to produce effects, and / or which may be influenced. Obviously, the "opinion" of the bourgeoisie have rushed to shake the specter of the increase of local influence by Iran, Khomeini, all of which can be said except that it is democratic and popular. But if we reason with our head (obviously at the cost of making a mistake) we have to detect that something is good to get back to the position of the great media . As things stand even the rebellion in Bahrain does not have the connotations of the Islamic revolt, but of political revolt in the name of democracy. Namely, the same revolt of the masses against the Iranian regime of Ayatollah of Tehran, the masses of shutters, that is, several decades of domination of those similpreti turbaned vaccinated compared to the charm of the "Islamic Republic" (unfortunately the repressive apparatus of the regime is still intact and too strong). It is true that psychoanalysis has warned about the rationality of human behavior, however, is not said that the uprising in Bahrain will have a drift pro-Iranian. In that case, could not produce secondary effects in Iran itself (which does not mean "impending downfall of the Iranian regime"). Additional effects - if the King of Bahrain will not be able to crush the rebellion - there will still be in neighboring Saudi Arabia, whose society seems deceptively dormant.
Saudi Arabia is a strange country and contradictory. The majority of the population is Sunni absolutism of the Saud dynasty - after the Great War - was imposed by force of arms adherence to the Wahhabi version of Sunni Islam, the country of export is the true center of radical Islamic virus, but it is very important and strategic ally of the U.S. oil producer, no one says anything, more in his ruling dynasty is made by people with a Middle Ages mentality but corrupt to the core, wildly hedonistic sense Sybarite and opposed by Islamic radicals more consistent. Even in Saudi Arabia there have been protests, with as yet no large following. At the time. But if the opposition the scheme were to take a different texture, then you might see a political dynamic very confrontational and dangerous with the results, as here, the radical Islamic element seems to be strong. But there is an unknown quantity to be introduced in the discourse: in the country there is also a discriminated minority Shiite, that inevitably would take oxygen from a reversal of the situation in Bahrain and could play a role in the reach still indeterminable. In addition, a hoped Democratic victory in Bahrain, in theory, could also exert an attractive symbolic power in Iraq and Lebanon, in favor of those sectors that support Shiites, but do not support the role played by local Ayatollah . We're talking about a possibility, sure, maybe contradicted by future events, but it is less than it might seem unreasonable, if we consider that by reason of its historical vicissitudes the Shiite world, before the victory of Khomeini in Iran, had taken on an aura of social radicalism so often - in domestic disputes in Islamic societies - the Shiite equivalent of "left", perhaps with a smell of communism. You might remember in this regard, what was the monarchy in Iran Tudeh Communist Party (and what would have been if he had been less flattened on the foreign policy of the USSR). And in Lebanon's civil war, the Shiite movement Amal began as an exponential expression of the underprivileged masses in the struggle for liberation and social justice. We hope to talk about that later. One final thought on the side of imperialism. Some intervention by U.S. or NATO could be implemented in Libya, or determination of a no-fly zone , or as "humanitarian aid" of Tunisian military and / or Egyptian, or supply of arms to the rebels. If so, recalling that the U.S. has left to massacre Kurds and Shiites in Iraq after the Gulf War, and who did not flinch in the face of bloodshed in Yemen, Tunisia, Algeria, Egypt, Bahrein, qualcuno dubita che la ragion d’essere stia nel petrolio libico?
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ADDRESSED IN THE ARAB WORLD, BUT ... Without revolution?
It is seen that the Arab masses in revolt do not seem satisfied with democracy understood as a tired repetition of electoral rituals that nothing changes (such that Edoardo Galeano once wrote that if the election would change things would be declared illegal) so much so that their dictatorial regimes they always held and manipulated. It is precisely the attitude of the so-called West (imperialist) in front of these revolts - a mixture of embarrassment, frost, concern over the loss of allies who actually were (and are supersititi) business associates - is indicative of how the claims semprre Democrats are dangerously subversive to the interests of the bourgeoisie. For those interests, ie, which historically have used these claims in the West to overthrow feudalism and royal absolutism, but that they have locked their newly established class dictatorship, in addition to render effective the role of institutionalized democracy in the constitutions Europe and America. So while the "first world" increasingly exploited masses than in previous decades - but not yet under such conditions only to lose their exploitation - mostly shaking walls and formalize their protest and distance them from their institutions through the disaffection election, on the other side of the Mediterranean we find the masses in struggle, and ready to shed their blood, to go beyond the façade of democracy imposed on them, and which can also be regarded as an Arabic version of the substance as been reduced democracy in the West. What rightly considered evil to active instruments and servants of capitalism. All this is altamente positivo e costituisce una gradita sorpresa, come pure il già notato carattere non islamico (in questa fase) delle attuali rivolte, nonché l’essere stati rovesciati da insurrezioni popolari spontanee due regimi dittatoriali. Questo tipo di rivoluzioni riscalda il cuore, tuttavia non va taciuto che gli entusiasmi suscitati dagli eventi di Tunisia ed Egitto, e quelli suscitabili da auspicati “effetti domino”, debbono essere un po’ contenuti, per cercare di vedere quanto in realtà rimane di potenzialmente negativo. Regimi dittatoriali marci fino al midollo, e i cui guardiani armati sono militari e poliziotti del luogo, in certe condizioni possono benissimo essere abbattuti da sommosse popolari, poiché anche ai brains of low-paid soldiers and police officers (and now must be professional tip, bakshish ) can overlook the question of what the meaning dell'ammazzare and being killed because they raise with their various family members and courtiers, continue to make life beautiful and unimaginable acculare billions and billions of dollars at home and abroad. This can happen, happens. Another thing, though, is to achieve adequate levels of political democracy to pave the way for forms of economic democracy.
Once there was talk of radical realization of bourgeois democracy in order to proceed more or less rapidly toward socialism. But for this purpose power structures are a popular and avant-garde apart from certain activities not organized in a position to point out to the masses not so much the goals to be pursued and the manner, the stages and the time to do it. In a word, we need a political revolution and social / economic analysis with appropriate tools. Notoriously
to overthrow a regime you do not need a prior revolutionary party - which has never produced a revolution, and indeed has always been taken by surprise at his outburst. However, after the escape or killing of the tyrant, an avant-garde is to move forward. Unfortunately, we can speak without fear of contradiction, of historical and consolidated its absence in the Arab world. And is not that today they see tracks. It would be difficult to throw a heavy cross upon-Soviet communist parties, which also formed in the Arab world, for their cooperative attitude with the Arab bourgeoisie "progressive" in most cases existing only in the world of desires, for the lack of their competition to the so-called "Arab socialism", or for flattening the contingent needs of the policy of the USSR. It would be easy but also unfair. Here does not come into play essentially the theoretical opposition between Islam and Marxism (consider, for example, Islam / Marxism developed in Iran by Mujahidyn of the People), but a number of objective factors are difficult to overcome, quali le dittature militari instuarate dal socialismo arabo nella fase in cui era davvero in auge fra le masse, l’appoggio politico e militare dato loro da Mosca, e infine le pesanti conseguenze negative che i partiti comunisti arabi avrebbero dovuto sopportare in caso di sconfessione dall’Urss. Tanto più che lo stesso appoggio sovietico, per esempio, non salvò dalle galere egiziane molti militanti comunisti. Si può forse sostenere che i comunisti arabi avrebbero fatto meglio a con compromettersi con i regimi “progressisti” (nei limiti del possibile), nonché a puntare su un cauto lavoro di lunga durata. Ma, ammesso pure che ciò fosse possibile (e non è detto), del senno di poi sono piene le fosse.
So today, the situation is what it is: the masses in revolt, as well as being the sun, will have to deal with being left intact the system of military and economic power, where dictators have been killed or at the point of it.
Substance is not to do, today, excessive illusions. Take Egypt. The people have won thanks to the attitude of the military. This election will, presumably less polluted than those made under Mubarak, and at best will rise to the top state respectable but harmless characters like Al Baraday, hoping that fail to make social policy a bit 'more humane and liberal domestic policy acceptably. However, those structures remain unchanged powerful that one day - gone the party - they'll come to impose their domination over the country, the prospects are not rosy for liberation. Those structures are not only members / economic but also military, and those managing their own interests including economic / financial. Do not forget that the military are to manage political power by the end of the monarchy. Have turned suddenly on the way to Tahrir Square? Hard to believe. The same goes for Tunisia. In Libya, then, the existence of potrolio is likely to make things worse. But since human history is the realm of surprises, we are waiting to see how it will end. The fact is that in that disastrato pezzo di mondo incombono fattori poderosi esterni (Usa, Ue, Israele, Iran) che non molleranno con facilità gli ossi e gli ossicini lì conquistati.
2 Marzo 2011
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