; of Pier Francesco Zarcone
Finalmente in parte del mondo arabo sta accadendo quel che prima o poi doveva accadere. Nei mass-media di maggior diffusione inviati speciali e opinionisti vanno ripetendo che in Tunisia, Egitto Libia (ma anche Bahrein, Yemen ecc.) le situazioni sembravano sotto controllo da parte dei corrotti despoti locali e non ci si poteva aspettare che gli eventi d’improvviso sarebbero precipitati. Si tratta di una sonora banalità, per giunta infondata, poiché le sommosse e le rivoluzioni di rado scoppiano nel preciso momento in cui ce le aspettiamo; semmai quando esistono situazioni di “disagio” di massa, al limite della sopportazione (o oltre), si può solo nutrire la certezza (Or hope) that sooner or later the people will descend into the streets, determined not to return to daily life before the radical change of things. Unexpected, therefore, there was nothing, beyond time X. Now we are anxious to find out what can be done immediately. It must be said that any hypothesis can be considered at the time - precisely - hypothetical, it is too early to make anything for sure. Not only for the objective flow of current events, but also for the differences between the various countries where the masses took to the field. However some consideration - Prudential - can be made, arguing on the existing.
Firstly it is important that you are faced with massive and spontaneous popular revolt, triggered by facts such as the classic spark that sets fire to the haystack. This spontaneity was inevitable because of the extreme weakness of the traditional political opposition in those countries. One could expect an Islamist insurgency, which has not been there, nor have seen Islamic radicals take the lead of the people in revolt. At least the state of the proceedings. This can give rise to doubts about the current incidence of "radical Islamists". It aroused the feeling of the images in Tahrir Square in Cairo, Egypt in the last days of the revolt, were stirred along with the Koran and the cross copta.Con This is not to say that there is no certain danger of Islamism. If anything, one wonders if there has been ipervalutato, in good and / or bad faith, as they have developed for both the events of recent days, for a consideration that does not seem to have enjoyed in the media: even when the end of the century Algeria was the last scene of a terrible massacre Islamist (who joined the government), the rest of the Maghreb there was not any significant infection, or significant support to Algerian jihadists. At the moment we could then talk about another scam spread by interested defenders of the Arab dictatorships: that is the ultimatum that stands as one alternativa a tali dittature l’estremismo islamista. Per come sono andate finora le cose non sembra che sia corretta una lettura degli avvenimenti alla luce della rivoluzione islamica dell’Iran. Ma c’è un “però”: è noto come nel corso degli eventi rivoluzionari spesso si verificano processi accelerati con l’esito di rendere egemoni minoranze prima poco considerate se queste, a differenza degli avversari, si sanno muovere interpretando le esigenze (almeno momentanee) delle masse. In atto, tuttavia, da queste masse non provengono istanze favorevoli a società radicalmente islamizzate. Anzi, in luogo della rivendicazione della sharía, abbiamo richieste di libertà democratiche e giustizia sociale. Sarà a case in Arab societies in revolt is consistent the presence of young and educated in various aspects also included provision for the world cultural and technological support for young people in the West? It will not take long to figure out if the application is correct. It should also be demystified the definition of "lay" for schemes directed by Ben Ali, Mubarak, Bouteflika etc.. If by that term must be understood schemes involved in structural reforms to modernize their countries and for greater social justice. It was instead of corrupt and tyrannical regimes, serves the needs of political / economic imperialism, backed by brutal military and comprador bourgeoisie. And because of these characteristics regimes could be a boon to Islamist radicalism and the various jihadists. But, as already mentioned, it seems that these currents have been able to draw significant benefits from the social movements in progress. This, at least for the moment. On this point, please read - the value of radiography Mubarak of Egypt - the story of 'Ala al-Aswani, The Yacoubian Building. If you currently lack the signs of a Iranian, however, much will depend on classes from the operations of local politicians and as "spouse" with the interference of imperialism, which so far has seen three of its bastions to fall in North Africa. It will drop more? That is, it will also in Morocco and Algeria? Morocco seems to be more stable institutional level, although not on the government. Translate: there the people want good government, but the monarchy - which also boasts the descent from the Prophet Muhammad - would not seem at risk. So it is time to bring the situation under control. A special case - and far more dangerous - it could be Algeria, to the extent that Algerian society is not really been decontaminated by the Islamist venom. But currently there is little evidence evaluation. Libyan dangerous is the situation once you reach the slaughter of the dictatorial regime which was often smuggled, also left as an anti-imperialist and nationalist revolution, inspired by green booklet of thought-Gaddafi. In fact, the risk that Somalia will become a Mediterranean Libya is not entirely unfounded. Not so much for religious reasons (for now), but because it is a world still strongly tribalization where - although the real tyranny of the Colonel - the state is rather weak, if not vanishing. Here, every scenario is possible, in the eventual formation of a lack of strong political leadership (which however will be for her to do a Libyan state). An event to be counted in the field of possibilities is such a secession of Cyrenaica, the implications today is not determinable. We said before the persistent flow of current events in North Africa, for the simple fact that it always break down the principle that a dictator does not mean automatic establishment of freedom and justice systems. In fact, on this side is not clear what the outcome will be. In Egypt in the military are clearly leading position as was the fall of the monarchy in the early '50s, and the 18th of February, about two million people demonstrated in Tahrir Square calling for democratic reforms including the end state of emergency, the release of political prisoners and the formation of a provisional government more affidabile.In Tunisia has not ended the fighting in the streets. Volendo fare il punto della situazione – o almeno cercando di farlo – va rilevato che se per rivoluzione politica e sociale s’intende l’abbattimento del ceto dominante (politico ed economico), allora si è in presenza di una fase solo potenzialmente prerivoluzionaria: ma non è detto che si passi alla vera e propria fase rivoluzionaria. È stata abbattuta la parte più putrida dei regimi di Tunisi e del Cairo; ma solo quella. Abbattere il resto dell’edificio non sarà per nulla facile, in mancanza di un progetto che agglutini le masse. E mettiamo poi, tra i fattori di costo, il ruolo degli interessi dell’imperialismo (statunitense, europeo e, soprattutto in Libia, anche italiano). Potrà ancora accadere tutto e il contrario di tutto, tanto più che i ribelli del Nordafrica sono soli con se stessi, stante la sostanziale ostilità del “primo mondo” all’avvento di democrazie popolari nel sud del Mediterraneo. In queste brevi note ci siamo limitati a parlare solo della parte nordafricana del mondo arabo, rimandando a un successivo intervento i casi della parte asiatica. Qui, infatti – e a prescindere dai problemi del regime degli ayatollah in Iran – è in corso anche una fase ulteriore della “riscossa degli sciiti” contro i musulmani sunniti (che tanto confratelli non sono), non solo nella “Mezzaluna fertile”, ma anche nella penisola araba.
Pier Francesco Zarcone
February 27, 2011
site http://www.utopiarossa.blogspot.com/
0 comments:
Post a Comment